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ABSTRACT
The article argues that current conceptual approaches in civil-military
relations are deeply flawed resulting in its irrelevance in analyzing
major issues including war and the collapse of democracy. After
highlighting major flaws in the work of the late Samuel Huntington
and those who follow his approach, the article argues that other
conceptual approaches, including Security Sector Reform, are also
flawed, or in the case of the “military effectiveness” literature,
largely irrelevant. In explaining the main causes of the flawed
conceptual literature, the article highlights the absence of good
data and challenges in methodology. While arguing that military
forces are very unlikely to engage in armed combat, it highlights
the roles and missions which in the world today are implanted by
these forces. As it is virtually impossible to prove effectiveness of
the armed forces in these roles and missions, the article proposes a





My goal in this essay is to present a conceptual framework for the analysis of civil-military
relations (CMR) that is also useful for the analysis of intelligence systems. As an essay it is
not a fully developed article with extensive empirical data. Rather it is intended to explain
the main things to be studied – the key factors, concepts, and variables – and the relation-
ship among them.1 The framework will be described and illustrated later in the essay. My
hope is that other scholars will see the value of the conceptual framework and develop
research projects that seek to identify the presence, or more likely absence, of what I
posit as requirements in CMR. In my opinion, the current approaches to CMR are not
useful, are in fact misleading, and the framework I advocate here can also apply to intelli-
gence systems. While there is a great deal of literature on various aspects of intelligence
systems in the so-called Five Eyes (The US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand), there is very little in the newer democracies where intelligence,
which in most cases was mainly dedicated to state security and was militarized, has yet
to overcome the stigma of its identification with human-rights abuses, in the previous
non-democratic regimes. Further, intelligence, or state security, and its reform, or better
creation under democratic civilian control, is very similar to the challenges of reforming
CMR. However, even in the case of the US, but for Amy Zegart, and to a lesser degree,
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Mark Lowenthal, the literature on intelligence focuses on specific components of an intel-
ligence system, rather than intelligence as a system.2
While the main focus is on CMR in new democracies, the essay deals tangentially with the
United States, mainly because the experience in the United States, and scholarly literature
somehow related to it, has an undue impact on analysis in new democracies. The catalyst
for writing this essay is my having read recently two important books. The first is Lawrence
Freedman The Future of War: A History in which this highly credible scholar of strategy
andwar includes virtually nomentionof the officers and soldierswhofightwars or the civilian
decision-makers who send them to war.3 This striking absence is analogous to writing about
education and not including professors and teachers, of medicine without including doctors
andnurses, or a legal systemwithout including lawyers.Military officers are professionals, and
the absence of including the professionals who wage war, and the civilian decision-makers
who send them to war, is startling.4 The second book is How Democracies Die by Steven
Levitsky andDaniel Ziblattwhich in the context of analyzing the potential death of democracy
in the United States, is accurate in emphasizing political parties and civil society, but comple-
tely ignores the role of themilitary.5 In the context of their book, although theydonot include a
mention, this role may be positive in that Generals Mattis and Kelly have helped maintain
some relative stability in the role of the United States in international security. The absence
of reference to themilitary is evenmore important in their analysis of the death of democracy
via coups in countries such as Chile and Peru, or the role of the military in keeping President
NicolásMaduro in power inVenezuela. Unfortunately,military coups,most recently in Egypt
and Thailand remain a common mechanism to terminate a democracy.6
The absence of any focus on civil-military relations in these two recent and excellent
books is for me evidence that the contribution of the sub-discipline of Comparative Poli-
tics that is civil-military relations theory is negligible. I believe, however, that fighting wars,
and other roles and missions of military professionals, is important, and that those who
implement the guidance of civilian decision-makers and their relations with these
decision-makers is worthy of analysis. In my opinion, the problem is that the mainstream
literature on civil-military relations is both heavily normative rather than empirical and
consequentially does not provide a suitable basis for scholars to include the military
and civilian decision-makers in analysis. If this literature has any conceptual framework,
and this will be dealt with later in this essay, it is wrong (Huntington), undifferentiated
(SSR), or not fully relevant (military effectiveness). This is a fact, despite the work of
several scholars currently making substantial contributions to the literature.7
Current CMR theory: impediments to analysis
The current frameworks for the analysis of CMR are very seriously flawed, as with Hun-
tington’s “normal theory,” undifferentiated and inconsistently defined as is Security Sector
Reform (SSR), or not quite to the point as with the literature on military effectiveness.
Huntington and control
The most often cited framework on CMR in the United States and abroad is that of Samuel
Huntington and his followers. It is with authority that Peter Feaver, one of the leading
experts on US CMR, wrote in 2003,
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Why bother with a model [Huntington’s] that is over forty years old? The answer is that
Huntington’s theory, outlined in The Soldier and the State, remains the dominant theoretical
paradigm in civil-military relations, especially the study of American civil-military relations.
…Huntington’s model is widely recognized as the most elegant, ambitious, and important
statement on civil-military relations theory to date. Moreover, Huntington’s prescriptions
for how best to structure civil-military relations continue to find a very receptive ear
within one very important audience, the American officer corps itself, and this contributes
to his prominence in the field.8
In Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot A. Cohen
refers to Huntington’s book as the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, “… the
accepted standard by which the current reality is to be judged.”9 Indeed, the 2007
Senior Conference at West Point took as its theme, “American Civil-Military Relations:
Fifty Years after The Soldier and the State.”10
Despite the prominence of Huntington’s theory, in his major book, Armed Servants,
Peter Feaver attempts to use his theory to explain how the United States prevailed in
the Cold War and concludes, “The lack of fit strongly suggest that Huntington’s theory
does not adequately capture American civil-military relations.”11
Huntington’s main focus in The Soldier and the State is the distinction of subjective
and objective civilian control. Subjective control attempts to limit military power,
both materially and in the officer corps’ capacity to wield its influence in the political
and social spheres. According to Huntington, this type of control makes the military
more civilian by turning them into the mirror of the state, which in turn brings about
a decline in military professionalism. Objective civilian control, in contrast, is
oriented towards the recognition of autonomous military professionals by trying to
establish an independent military sphere. It is assumed that a highly professional
military corps of officers will have the ability to subordinate themselves to the
decisions and orientation of a legitimate state authority, regardless of its political
orientation.12
There are three main flaws with Huntington’s work that render it, and those who follow
it, useless for empirical analysis of civil-military relations. First is the tautological nature of
his argument; second is his use of selective data; and third is his exclusive focus on civilian
control of the armed forces. Together, these methodological weaknesses are virtually
insurmountable obstacles to scholarship that, although acknowledged by American and
other experts on CMR, have not been remedied.13
First, at its core Huntington’s framework is a tautology – it cannot be proved or dis-
proved. Huntington focuses on what he terms “professionalism” in the officer corps,
and bases his argument on the distinction between what he terms “objective” and “subjec-
tive” control. As Bengt Abrahamsson wrote 45 years ago,
Essentially, a “professional” officer corps is one which exhibits expertise, responsibility, and
corporateness. “Professionalism,” however, to Huntington also involves political neutrality;
as a result, “professionalism” and “objective control” are inseparable as theoretical concepts.
The immediate consequence of this is to rule out the empirical possibility of establishing the
relationship between the degree of professionalism and the degree of political neutrality. Hun-
tington’s thesis becomes, in Carl Hempel’s words, “a covert definitional truth.” In other
words, professional officers never intervene, because if they do, they are not true
professionals.14
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Peter Feaver, who was Huntington’s student at Harvard, more delicately than Abrahams-
son, analyzes Huntington’s chain of causation, which in his words has bedeviled the sub-
field from the beginning.
The causal chain for Huntington’s prescriptive theory runs as follows: autonomy leads to
professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which
leads to secure civilian control. The heart of his concept is the putative link between profes-
sionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, this was not so much a relation-
ship of cause and effect as it was a definition: “A highly professional officer corps stands
ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority
within the state.” (Huntington 1957, pp. 74, 83-84). A professional military obeyed civilian
authority. A military that did not obey was not professional.15 (Emphasis added.)
A second problem with Huntington’s approach is the selective choice of data, that of the
military as a profession, as the key explanatory variable. “Professionalism,” similarly to
“culture,” is not a fixed or solid fact. The qualities that make up professionalism, identical
to culture, are subjective, dynamic, and changing. Indeed, a fundamental goal of the Gold-
water-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to promote joint professional mili-
tary education, a goal that has been largely achieved across the US armed forces. The US
Congress compelled the military services to educate and utilize their officers jointly and
in so doing transformed the culture of the US armed forces, something that Huntington
assumed to be largely static. Whether the change of culture has resulted in increased
combat effectiveness is a separate issue. Other countries, including Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Spain, are currently changing their professional military education in order to
transform the culture of the military. In short, the meaning of military professionalism is
not static; it can be, and has been, changed through intentional programs of incentivized
education.
In 1962, five years after Huntington published The Soldier and the State, Samuel
E. Finer, in his book The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, criticized
Huntington’s approach by observing that “professionalism” in and of itself has little
meaning, and, “… in fact often thrusts the military into collision with the civil auth-
orities.”16 One has to dissect and analyze “professionalism” to determine its relevance.
This is what Alfred Stepan did a decade after Finer, in his classic research on the Brazilian
military and the coup of 1964. Stepan coined the term “The New Professionalism,” which
he described as a new paradigm based on internal security and national development, in
contrast with the “old professionalism” of external defense.17 In complete contradiction to
Huntington’s theory, Stepan demonstrated empirically that rather than keeping the mili-
tary out of politics and under civilian control, the new professionalism politicized the mili-
tary and contributed to role expansion which resulted in military rule in Brazil between
1964 and 1985.18
More recently, in his 2007 book on the history of the US Army, The Echo of Battle: The
Army’s Way of War, Brian M. Linn raises fundamental questions about the way Hunting-
ton simplifies and glosses over major variations in the US military profession.19 What for
Huntington was a unified officer corps in Linn’s analysis were in fact several schools of
thought and individuals competing for ascendance within the US Army. In explicitly con-
tradicting Huntington’s interpretation, Linn states “But as a historical explanation for the
evolution of American military thought between 1865 and 1898, the thesis [of Hunting-
ton] imposes a false coherence upon an era of confusion and disagreement, of many
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wrong turns and mistaken assumptions.”20 The point here is that Huntington defined as
largely static and readily identifiable a quality that was in fact dynamic and nebulous. Pro-
fessionalism, as a static concept, is definitely not a basis on which to build an argument
about democratic civilian control of the armed forces.
A third problem in Huntington’s approach is its exclusive focus on control, to the detri-
ment of all other dimensions of civil-military relations. In the introduction to The Soldier
and the State, he writes,
Previously the primary question was: what pattern of civil-military relations is most compa-
tible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplanted by the more
important issue: what pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the security of
the American nation?21
Nowhere in the rest of the 534-page book, however, does Huntington return to this
issue of military effectiveness. By contrast, he devotes an entire chapter to the topic of
control, where he posits the putative objective and subjective models of civilian control
of the armed forces. In sum, Huntington’s focus on civil-military relations is exclusively
on democratic civilian control.
Similarly, control is the exclusive focus in the overwhelming majority of literature on
US civil-military relations. Dale R. Herspring, a respected American expert on strategy,
defense, and civil-military relations writes,
As I surveyed the literature on civil-military relations in the United States, I was struck by the
constant emphasis on “control.” A common theme was that the United States had to guard
against any effort by the American military to assert its will on the rest of the country.22
In a 1999 review article, Peter Feaver states that,
Although civil-military relations is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of
relationships between the military and civilian society at every level, the field largely
focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in
nation-states.23
In that publication, and others, he utilizes the concept of problematique. Most recently,
Feaver, in a review essay of three recent books on civil – military relations emphasizes
again and again control. At the beginning of his review he states approvingly
Each of the studies shows that it is possible to offer fresh insights on an issue as enduring as
the civil-military problematique: how to make the military an effective defender of the state
without also making the military a capable threat to the state.24
I am not suggesting that we ignore the importance of democratic civilian control, particu-
larly in newer democracies, but the sole focus on it in the United States is misplaced and
distracts from the other dimensions. Furthermore, it is empirically wrong. The US Con-
stitution is the oldest written constitution in the world, and, as Richard Kohn demon-
strates, the framers devoted a great deal of attention to the need for a military, how to
make the military effective, and how to keep it under control. 25 These three points –
need, effectiveness, and control, were, and remain, at least for me, the key dimensions
of civil-military relations. Better, they should be, but in the US literature, and by the
influence of American literature in much of the world, the only issue is control. This
seems ludicrous today when most observers of politics in the United States welcomed
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the stability provided by Generals Mattis and Kelly to the mercurial President Trump. As
Eliot Cohen stated in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services committee in support of
General Mattis obtaining the waiver necessary for his becoming Secretary of Defense.
I have sharply criticized President Obama’s policies but my concerns pale in comparison with
the sense of alarm I feel about the judgment and dispositions of the incoming White House
team. In such a setting, there is no question in my mind that a Secretary Mattis would be a
stabilizing and moderating force, preventing wildly stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from
happening over time, helping to steer American foreign and security policy in a sound and
sensible direction.26
The exclusive focus on control, to the neglect of all other possible dimensions of CMR, one
of which – effectiveness – is included in my framework described below, can result in a
statement such as the following:
The democratic imperative insists that this precedence applies even if civilians are woefully
underequipped to understand the technical issues at stake. Regardless of how superior the
military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what
they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, civilians have a right
to be wrong.27
When President Donald Trump bragged about his nuclear button being bigger than Kim
Jung-Un’s, who he insisted on calling “Little Rocket Man,” as he did in early January 2018,
before meeting with him on 12 June 2018 and among other things, providing him with
“security guarantees,” the concern of Eliot Cohen rings true. 28
Despite the serious shortcomings of Huntington’s The Soldier and the State it is still
cited extensively and approvingly, mainly but not only in the United States. This
cannot be due to its serving as a model for empirical analysis or accuracy. Rather, I
believe it has two main reasons: First, as noted by Feaver in the quote above, the US
armed forces welcome Huntington’s notion of “objective control” as it legitimates them
to manage their own affairs; the United States, and other country’s armed forces treasure
Huntington as his writing gives them a fig leaf to govern themselves; to enjoy autonomy.
Second, also noted by Feaver as prescriptive theory Huntington’s book is normative politi-
cal theory, an effort to state what should be, and clearly not an empirical study whose
findings could be replicated. Unfortunately, the prescriptive or normative dimension per-
vades most of the US literature on CMR. The result is, as Paul Bracken states
… . the study of civil-military relations as it has developed in the United States is that it has
petrified into a sort of dogma, so that conceptual innovation and new problem identification
earn the reproach of not having applied the theory correctly.29
Security sector reform
Security Sector Reform (SSR) was developed as a reaction to the limitations of CMR in
which Huntington was the main proponent.30 Its proponents conceptualize SSR to
include, on the one hand, a more comprehensive “security community” in the process
of democratization, civil–military relations, and conflict prevention rather than only the
traditional armed forces. On the other hand, they also hope to inspire a more thorough
understanding of today’s security environment.31 Proponents of SSR argue that, because
human security and development matter as much as defense against external and internal
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threats (of both a military and non-military nature), armed forces cannot, alone, deal with
these challenges. They further argue that ensuring security requires a collaborative
approach among a wider array of military and civilian institutions, which they term the
“security sector.”
For its proponents, at a minimum the security sector encompasses all the organizations
that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the
state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their manage-
ment and oversight. These include: the military; specialized peace support operation
forces; intelligence agencies; justice and law-enforcement institutions; the civilian struc-
tures that manage them; and representatives of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and the mass media.32 At the maximum, the security sector includes all of the
above, plus other militarized non-state groups that play a role, even negative, in security
issues, such as guerrillas and liberation armies.
SSR has made conceptual contributions as it fills in some of the gaps in the normal
concept of CMR, while not specifically dealing with the details of this normal concept.
First, the SSR agenda moves away from considering the military to be the sole security
provider of a nation, and proposes a broad concept of a uniformed/ non-uniformed
“sector” or “community” whose members must work together to achieve security.
Second, it takes into account the interchangeable roles and missions of security sector
components. These include, for example, armed forces performing police and diplomatic
tasks, as well as social development work, while police and other law-enforcement bodies
perform military tasks to safeguard society against external threats, in particular after ter-
rorist attacks. The concept also includes the internationalization of the security agencies
(international/multinational peace support operations and/or police forces; international
anti-terrorism cooperation among intelligence agencies).
Third, SSR conceptualizations explicitly link security sector reform directly to broader
efforts toward democratization, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention, and post-
conflict reconstruction. It seeks to connect to wider political, economic, social, and cultural
transformations that accompany democratization, as well as taking into account civil
society which is expected to be involved in influencing policymaking, violence reduction
and conflict prevention.
Problems with the SSR conceptualization
Despite claims that SSR better suits the contemporary security and political environment,
it does not even begin to meet minimal requirements for a consistent conceptual
framework.
First, there is a total lack of consensus among SSR proponents about what the security
sector encompasses. This is a problem since, according to Timothy Edmunds, an early and
leading proponent of SSR, if a security sector is too broadly defined it jeopardizes under-
standing of the security sector and hence what is needed to reform it. For example, to
include non-military bodies (such as the health care system) which, although it may
undoubtedly play an important role in the provision of a nation’s security, takes us
beyond the key responsibility of the security sector which is the legitimate use of
force.33 In addition, conceptualizing the security sector so that it includes all the organiz-
ations that use force, whether or not they are part of the government (for instance,
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guerrillas and liberation armies) also jeopardizes the utility of SSR as they have no affilia-
tion with the state.34
Second, there is no basic understanding of what SSR stands for, or what its agenda, fea-
tures, challenges, and effects are.35 In my research on SSR, I have found a huge variety of
definitions, at least a dozen, ranging from “the provision of security within the state in an
effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control” to “the
transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and demo-
cratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens,”
which “requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strengthening civilian
control and oversight of the security sector; demilitarization and peace-building; and
strengthening the rule of law.”36 In this sense, while the SSR concept has been formally
adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
various states in their official foreign policy documents, the ways countries supposedly
implement it differ greatly. 37 In addition, although several security programs were
implemented as part of a SSR agenda, they dealt with only limited SSR components
(e.g. police or armed forces reform, including pensions), while not embracing its
vaunted holistic characteristics, thus failing to comply with a crucial element of the SSR
normative model.38
Third, and most importantly for my purposes in this essay, SSR lacks a consistent con-
ceptualization, which necessarily follows from the diverse definitions. It is instead put
forward as either a long “checklist” that countries’ aid agencies need to complete for
policy reasons (such as strengthening the armed forces, police, and judicial bodies’ capa-
bilities; improving civilian management and democratic control of the security sector; and
promoting respect for human rights and transparency); 39 as a “context-depending” situ-
ation (for example, developmental, post-authoritarian or post-conflict);40 or as different,
but possibly overlapping, “generations” (the first generation of reforms that focuses
mainly on control, or the second generation of reforms that includes effectiveness and
efficiency).41 Of all the many conceptualizations we reviewed, the approach Timothy
Edmunds proposes is both most useful and similar to what I suggest in this essay.42
In short, while it proponents claim that SSR replaces the standard, in Cohen’s terms,
normal conceptualization of civil-military relations, in the absence of a basic and consist-
ent conceptualization, it does not suffice. Rather, it is primarily a justification for states’
and international organizations’ development assistance programs, which requires mul-
tiple and malleable definitions to support the funding.
Military effectiveness
The burgeoning academic field of military effectiveness is by far the most analytical within
the field of civil-military relations, and includes an emphasis on “Big Data.” The main con-
tributors work in the field of International Politics rather than Comparative Politics,
let alone the sub-field of civil-military relations. The authors utilize hypotheses and con-
struct variables for measurement of military effectiveness.43 The literature can be divided
into arguments about how states choose winnable wars (“selection” arguments) versus
arguments about how well states prosecute the wars they fight (“warfighting” arguments).
Selection arguments focus on characteristics of a state’s institutions – such as regime type
or civil-military relations – that make it good or bad at selecting winnable wars.
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Warfighting arguments focus on variables that prevent states from fielding effective mili-
tary forces or that hinder the performance of those forces on the battlefield. One important
argument is that coup-proofed militaries are unlikely to fight well against external
opponents given that they are oriented towards providing internal security and systema-
tically purged of capable (and hence threatening, to the leader) officers. Even though the
dependent variables in this literature are usually things like war outcomes, battle out-
comes, loss-exchange ratios, territory gained/lost, etc., many of the independent variables
are not particularly “military.” Two of the most important variables are political regime
type (democracy vs. autocracy, and, increasingly differences among various types of
non-democracies) and CMR. For example, Risa Brooks’s book Shaping Strategy, which
uses the level of preference divergence and the balance of power between military and civi-
lian officials to explain “strategic assessment,” the process through which relations
between political goals and strategies, and military strategies, are evaluated and
decided.44 Another is Caitlin Talmadge’s The Dictator’s Army, in which she analyzes
how leaders prioritize different threats affects how they structure their militaries.
Armies that are optimized for coup-prevention are unlikely to be able to fight well
against other militaries, for example.45 The findings in this literature, however, are not par-
ticularly relevant since it focuses on armed conflict, mainly interstate wars, and less than
two – dozen countries have in one way or another been engaged in interstate warfare since
1946.46
Interstate wars are indeed a rare phenomenon in the post-WWII world – both before
and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Correlates of War Project collects data on
four basic types of wars: (I) inter-state wars; (II) extra-state wars (including “colonial wars”
and “imperial wars”); (III) intra-state wars (civil wars, regional internal wars and inter-
communal wars); and (IV) and non-state wars, conducted by non-state actors.47 Of the
655 wars in the period 1816–2007, only 89 were interstate wars; that is, armed conflicts
that have had sustained combat involving regular armed forces on both sides and 1000
battle-related fatalities among the states involved. In the period 1946–2007, there were
38 international wars, of which nine – including the US-led invasions of Afghanistan
(2001) and Iraq (2003) – were fought after 1989. For instance, the last interstate wars
in Latin America were the Chaco War between Bolivia and Peru (1932-1935) and the
so-called Football War, a brief war fought between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969.
In sub-Saharan Africa, there have been only four interstate wars after 1946.
The problem of methodology
As I reviewed the literature ostensibly on civil-military relations and found it wanting, I
had to ask myself how this could be? One would hope that the “facts” would not allow
the sub-field to go so wrong. I thus had to examine the “facts;” how we know what we
know, and have identified three serious problems in methodology that could impede
the development of the sub-field. The first is that there is no quantitative data on the
main issues in civil-military relations and even more so for intelligence. That is, the “multi-
laterals” (including World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc.) are not allowed to
collect and publish data with regard to military matters. What they would collect, if they
could, is of course a further challenge. Therefore, the data that political economists take for
granted is simply unavailable. In the conceptual approach I present below, the only
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variable on which there is any data at all, defense budgets, is decent when taken from Jane’s
Defense Budgets. 48 On intelligence this data is mainly unavailable, and when it is available,
as in Brazil, it is impossible to know what is included and excluded, making comparisons
impossible.
Second is the general lack of survey data that is at all credible. I became aware of this
when I was in Mali in 2010 and 2011 which Freedom House listed as “free” with positive
ratings, but it was clear to me from interviews with informed civilians and military officers
that even before the coup in 2012 Mali was not “free.” Later, I was asked to participate in a
global (15 million data points across 173 countries from 1900 until 2012) survey of democ-
racy, which included no variables regarding the armed forces and intelligence. This data is
available at https://www.v-dem.net. The only credible data I have seen is from the Bertels-
mann Transformation Index, found at https://www.bti-project.org/en/index/ which has
been used by Professor Aurel Croissant and his colleagues for a very useful article on
control.49
Third, as anybody who has ever attempted to develop data bases knows, data in and of
itself has to be defined as such by a researcher and given a value, in numerical form. That
is, facts do not speak for themselves. The main data bases that I have reviewed, including
the Correlates of War (COW) project, are all are susceptible to the critique of Lawrence
Freedman regarding not only war, but also the instruments of war – military forces –
and even more so the relationship between these forces and civilian decision-makers.
But instead of understanding war as part of the stream of history, so that particular instances
could be understood in context, past conflicts were itemized and categorized in an artificial
manner in order to facilitate comparisons that only had any validity at a high and often banal
level of generality.50
I have reviewed eight data bases, many of them used in articles ostensibly dealing with
civil-military relations, and find that they may be useful for regime change, including mili-
tary coups, but do not deal adequately with the military, let alone decision-makers, as
actors.51 There is absolutely nothing that includes different functions and agencies of intel-
ligence in this Big-N data methodology.
Need for a new concept of CMR
For all of the reasons outlined above – a flawed Huntington formulation and single –
minded focus on control, SSR that means everything and nothing, military effectiveness
which does not capture what most militaries do, and the absence of useful “data” leads
me to conclude the need for a reconceptualization of CMR in terms of institutions that
provide capacity or capabilities. What contemporary militaries are mainly (with some
notable exceptions) involved in are peacekeeping, fighting terrorists and insurgents, sup-
porting civilians in natural and man-made disasters, and military diplomacy. This is what
they do, or are prepared to do, regardless of what they or the civilians say they are doing. 52
Roles and missions
In light of what most militaries really do in most of the world most of the time, we sum-
marize their roles and missions in the following categories:53 combatting insurgents,
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countering terrorism, peace keeping, supporting police in countering gangs and organized
crime, and military support to civilian authorities in the face of natural or man-made dis-
asters. Later, I will stipulate the minimum requirements for implementing these roles.
For example, even France, that is engaged in armed combat in North Africa, and is a
nuclear-armed country, currently has deployed between 7500 and 10,000 troops within
the country in support of counter-terrorism missions.54 As of June 2017, there were
96,853 military and police personnel from up to 127 countries engaged in peacekeeping
operations in 16 (post-) conflict countries. In Afghanistan, from August 2003 to December
2014, the NATO-led, UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at its
height was more than 130,000 strong, with troops from 51 NATO and partner nations.
Since January 2015, the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) is attempting to
train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions with 13,576 troops from
39 NATO and partner nations (as of May 2017). Between June 2004 and April 2017,
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) contained 3707 uni-
formed military and police personnel, mostly from Brazil and other South American
nations, who were engaged in various efforts in disaster recovery, reconstruction and
stabilization. In many other regions, especially in Central and South America and
South and Southeast Asia, military forces either support or, currently in the case of
Mexico and Timor-Leste, supplant police forces in operations combating drug-trafficking
and street crime.
Further, in countries as different as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
the Philippines, the police fulfill military functions. 55 Furthermore, since threats span the
spectrum from global terrorism, national and international drug cartels, to street gangs,
militaries and police forces rely heavily on intelligence agencies to identify threats and
plan missions. Finally, especially in South and Southeast Asia, the militaries’ roles and mis-
sions diversified and expanded over time. Although national defense formally remains the
primary function of the armed forces and the depth of their involvement in political and
civilian affairs varies among individual countries, many Asian militaries took on a multi-
tude of secondary roles, engaging in commercial activities, local administration, social
development and civic action projects, and putting down internal insurrections.56
The most obvious common feature of these real, versus rhetorical, roles and missions is
that there is no easy way to declare victory; no way to demonstrate military effectiveness.
In combatting insurgents, with even the most successful and recent cases being Colombia,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka there are long-term political reasons for these insurgencies, if and
when negotiations begin they go on and on, there are set backs, and there are severe
issues of foreign monitoring and meddling. Like the political dynamics behind them,
they are very complicated and confused. In countering terrorism the main challenge is
that terrorists have the advantage and if there is not a terrorist incident it cannot be
proven whether it was due to military and other security actors’ readiness or that the ter-
rorists decided not to strike. With peacekeeping, again there are historical and political
reasons for the deployment of military forces under the UN, EU, or NATO, and peace-
keepers can help, by separating insurgent forces and providing stability; but “success”
however it is defined, is evasive and fleeting. When it comes to providing support to
the police and supporting civilians in man-made or natural disasters, criminals will
never disappear nor will earthquakes, fires, hurricanes and the like ever be abolished.
That is, what all of these roles and missions have in common is that the military are
DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS 11
deployed to deal with a very complicated situations, and success is all but impossible to
define let alone achieve.
In my study of intelligence, particularly in the new democracies, we see similarities in
the intelligence system with the real (vs. supposed) roles and missions of the military.57
That is, intelligence must deal with not only known unknowns but also “unknown
unknowns.” Success, should it exist, can generally not be acknowledged, and it is often
partial. Further, intelligence has other similarities to military issues. The military and intel-
ligence have the same overall goal – to ensure a state’s security. While secrecy is para-
mount in intelligence, it also applies to the military, particularly in terms of
“operational security” or OPSEC. Access, for outsiders to both the military and intelli-
gence agencies is very difficult, and their operations are opaque at best. In much of the
world, and clearly in non-democratic regimes, intelligence was highly militarized, but
not necessarily part of the armed forces.58 Indeed, even in the United States but for the
FBI, all intelligence was under the military until after WWII and the creation of the
CIA. Even today, some 80% of the intelligence budget in the United States goes to the
agencies within the Department of Defense.59
Whereas in the Five Eyes on which there is a huge amount of literature, one can focus
on a large variety of issues. However, even in the United States, and clearly necessary in
most of the world, intelligence should be seen as a system and not a random assortment
of issues including counter-intelligence, covert operations, oversight, etc. From my
research the author that most consistently and effectively deals with intelligence, in this
case in the United States, as a system is Amy Zegart who looks at both institutions and
includes, as necessary, its political dimension. 60
The requirements
My analytical framework, rather than focusing on results, which the combat effectiveness
framework focuses on, or the confusion of the previously discussed frameworks, is to focus
on requirements. That is, to determine what is necessary in terms of institutions, for the
military to be under democratic civilian control and for it to be effective in the roles and
missions that it actually seeks to achieve. And, what is required for an intelligence system
to be able to provide accurate and timely information to civilian and military decision-
makers. In my experience, particularly in most of the newer democracies, I can readily
identify the absence of these institutions. This may not be politically correct, and those
in the know are loath to acknowledge these facts, but candor could provide decision-
makers, and foreign sponsors with an agenda for action, should they be interested.
It can to be stated bluntly and up front that democratic civilian control of the military,
and for that matter intelligence agencies, is easily achieved, should civilians be interested in
achieving it (which, for a variety of reasons they may not be). At its simplest, the civilians
take control of the budgets and management of personnel; mainly promotions and retire-
ments.61 However, to achieve effectiveness is extremely difficult, as will become clear from
the requirements I identify for countries that strive for effectiveness in different roles and
missions. That is, not all good things – democratic civilian control and effectiveness in
roles and missions – go together. It is probably for this reason, plus the pernicious
influence of Huntington, that the overwhelming focus in newer democracies is on
control.62 Control is relatively easy to achieve, and is politically correct internationally
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and with most international and domestic academics, NGOs, think tanks, and policy-
makers.
In what follows I will very briefly describe and discuss the institutional requirements for
both democratic civilian control of the military and for an intelligence system that serves
the needs of the civilian and military decision-makers.63 My colleague and I have in fact
been successful in the application of this framework for both the military and intelli-
gence.64 Here I will provide examples of the institutional requirements for both demo-
cratic civilian control and effectiveness of both military and intelligence organizations
or agencies. These institutions are the core of our conceptual framework. Their presence,
and functioning, can be determined through research, as we have done and in most cases
published on, in at least 20 countries on four continents.65
The requirements control
In order for any control mechanism at all, there must first be a legal basis for that control.
This may be found in a constitution, organic laws, or any variety of laws that vary tremen-
dously from country to country. Then, we have found that there are three main insti-
tutions that have been developed to provide control by democratically elected civilians
over the armed forces and intelligence agencies. The most preferred and immediate
means to control the military today is a civilian-led ministry of defense (MOD) in
which the democratically elected president or prime minister either appoints on his or
her own, or subject to the approval of a legislature, a minister. A real and robust MOD
must have power in the areas of budget, personnel, strategy, and policy. For the control
of intelligence, the currently preferred institutions are intelligence agencies run by individ-
uals similarly appointed or nominated by the chief executive. In both cases, regarding the
military and intelligence, the institutions provide guidance.
One thing is the role of the executive power over the military and intelligence services
or agencies. Another thing is to ensure that they are in fact doing what the executive and/
or the legislative body intends for them to do. Institutions have thus been created to
conduct oversight. In the executive this can be via inspector generals and general counsels.
In the legislative bodies it is by means of committee hearings and audits. Very often, both
sets, in the executives and the legislatures, they are stimulated by civil society, most often
in the form of the media, NGOs, and think tanks. The oversight mechanisms apply to the
military, but are even more elaborate in intelligence where there is an even greater empha-
sis on secrecy than in the military.
While the institutions engaged in guidance and oversight are immediate, another set of
institutions seeks to control in advance, through education. There is a great amount of lit-
erature on professional military education (PME), the reform of which has been success-
fully undertaken in not only the United States, but newer democracies such Argentina, and
Brazil. And, there is some attention in the literature to the education and training of intel-
ligence professionals. As in much else, the greatest attention, and possibly even advances,
has been made in this area of education in the United States.66 For example, the National
Intelligence University has been accredited as a PME institution, with inspections and
audits. However, in other countries, ranging, in our personal experience, from Argentina
to Portugal to Romania, the intelligence academies have undergone reform in which the
education and training in tradecraft has been married to am emphasis on control and
ethics more generally.
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Effectiveness
As with control, there are three main requirements for effectiveness.
The first is a policy or plan which defines a goal and the means to achieve it. In most
cases in terms of the military and defense there is an understanding of national security
policy, objectives, and priorities. It should be noted that in the United States the executive
is directed by law to produce annually a national security strategy (although during the
George W. Bush and Barak Obama administrations there were only two during eight
years). Other important examples of countries that produce national security strategies
are Colombia and Australia. Some are more realistic than others. In regard to intelligence,
some countries, including the United States and with Brazil the most recent, publish a
National Intelligence Strategy. Even in the absence of a published strategy for intelligence,
countries might utilize the so-called Intelligence Cycle to define and achieve the infor-
mation they require for intelligence to be effective. In regard to intelligence cycles, the
one we have found most useful is Mark Lowenthal’s formulation highlighting a linear
process with continual feedback loops.67 His concept is clear and amenable to comparison
across cases. In his formulation, the intelligence cycle consists of seven steps. 68
Whereas MODs and the intelligence agencies are designed and utilized to provide
democratic civilian control, it has become evident in countries throughout the world
that if countries want their militaries to be effective, they complement the civilian – led
MODs, which are most often created to ensure control, with military-led joint or
general staffs. 69 At a minimum, these institutions provide a means for mutual education,
particularly of senior military to civilian decision-makers so that the latter better under-
stand what is possible. And, in the case of intelligence, national security councils (NSC)
at a national level and fusion centers at a lower level, are created to coordinate the collec-
tion and dissemination of intelligence.
It is no secret that it requires resources, in the first instance money, which can be con-
verted into personnel, education and training, equipment, and operational expenses for a
military to be able to do anything; to be effective. It is in this regard that it is perfectly
obvious that most countries are not serious about military effectiveness as they dedicate
a very small percentage of GDP or national budgets to national defense and the military.
These data are easily found in IISS’s Military Balance, Jane’s Defense Budgets or SIPRI.
With regard to intelligence, with the exception of a few countries (including Brazil) it is
virtually impossible to obtain complete information.
In sum, and to reiterate, the focus in this essay and in my approach to analysis is on the
institutional requirements for control and effectiveness. In most instances, it is the absence
of these institutions which defines if a country is serious, or not. All of these institutions
can be identified and evaluated by a competent researcher. The methodology demands
that the researcher comes armed with a series of questions, defined by the conceptual fra-
mework presented here, and conduct interviews. There is no other, easier, way to obtain
the required information. 70
Conclusion
Maybe it would be best if I finished this essay as I began it, with reference to the two books
that stimulated me to write. My point is to insist on the importance of including the mili-
tary dimension, commonly termed civil-military relations. In reference to Lawrence
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Freedman in his The Future of War I would call his attention to my 2017 article “Security
Providers: Obstacles to Effectiveness in Democracies,” in which I argue that the George
W. Bush administration failed in Iraq in large part due to an absence of clear policy
and a functional inter-agency process that could coordinate the US effort at what ulti-
mately became nation building. In reference to Levitsky and Ziblatt I would call their
attention to my “Challenges in building partner capacity: Civil-military relations in the
United States and new Democracies” in which I argue that the challenges in the so-
called new democracies to consolidate democracy are radically different from what we
face in the United States.71 In short, and in conclusion, my argument is that the armed
forces are a key element of stability, or instability, in a country, and the conceptual frame-
work provided here can assist serious researchers to identify key requirements for the
implementation of different roles and missions of both the armed forces and intelligence
agencies, mainly, but not only, in newer democracies.
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